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Priorities Between Chattel Mortgagee
or Conditional Seller and
Subsequent Lienors
HORACE E. WHITESIDE t
It is the intention of the writer to discuss in this article the relative
merits of the conflicting claims which arise between a chattel mort-
gagee, claiming under a duly recorded chattel mortgage, and an
artisan, repairman, carrier, innkeeper, agister, or other lien claimant
who is attempting to assert a lien upon the goods in question as
against the interest of the prior mortgagee, the services of the lien
claimant having been rendered at the instance of the mortgagor in
possession. Substantially the same problem arises when the lienor
has acted at the request of a conditional buyer in possession and then
claims a lien against the title of the conditional seller. The effect of
failure on the part of the mortgagee or conditional seller to record his
encumbrance, as required by statute, will be considered at some length
below, but in general the reader may assume that the encumbrance is
duly recorded unless an express statement to the contrary appears.
The common law lien upon personal property arose by implica-
tion.' It was nothing more than a personal right of detainer; it con-
ferred no right to use or sell the chattel in question, and the lienor
must bear the expense of keeping it.2 The common law lien was not
assignable; it was lost if possession was given up by the lienor.3 It
will be worth while to mention briefly the common law liens with
which this article is chiefly concerned, together with the principles
upon which they were based and a suggested classification. (I) The
lien in favor of a repairman or artisan was recognized at common law
from comparatively early times and was apparently based upon the
principle that a bailee who had by his services or labor increased the
value of a chattel or materials at the request of the owner was in
justice entitled to retain the improved article until his charges were
tAssistant Professor, Cornell University College of Law.
'Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466 (1844); In re Leith's Estate, L. R.
I P. C. (Eng.) 296 (1866).
2Ridgley v. Inglehart, 3 Bland (Md.) 540 (1832); Aldine Mfg. Co. v. Phillips,
118 Mich. 162 (1898); Burrough v. Ely, 54W. Va. 118 (1903); Thames Iron Works
Co. v. Patent Derrick Co., i John. & H. (Eng.) 93 (i86o); Somes v. British Em-
pire Shipping Co., 8 H. of L. (Eng.) 338 (i86o).3McFarland v. Wheeler, 26 Wend. (N. Y.) 467 (1841); Ruggles v. Walker, 34
Vt. 468 (T86I).
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paid.4 It was not generally thought that this principle included
carriers,5 warehousemen, 6 wharfingers,7 and agisters,8 though it
would now be conceded that at least the first three of these bailees do
in fact add to the value of the chattel in the economic sense. (II) The
innkeeper's lien was based upon the principle that he should be repaid
by this privilege for the exceptional liability to which he was held and
for the duty to serve all transients who should apply at his inn so far
as his accomodations permitted.9 The innkeeper was accorded a lien
not only upon the goods of his guest, but also upon the goods of third
parties brought to the inn by the guest and received by the innkeeper
on the faith of the innkeeping relation.'0 There is some doubt
whether the lien accorded to common carriers should be classed with
the innkeeper's lien on the ground that the carrier is under the same
exceptional liability and duty to serve, or with the artisan's lien men-
tioned above, or with the class of liens based upon mercantile custom.
The same question arises in respect of the liens sometimes given by
the common law to a wharfinger or warehouseman. (III) A third and
rather well defined class of common law liens is that based upon mer-
cantile custom. This class includes the general liens given to bankers,
attorneys, factors, brokers, consignees, etc." With this group we will
not have occasion to deal at any great length. (IV) At common law
the agister or livery stable keeper was not accorded a lien to secure
his charges since he was not thought to increase the value of the
4Green v. Farmer, 4 Burr. (Eng.) 2214 (1768), dyer; Franklin v. Hosier, 4 B. &
Ald. (Eng.) 341 (1821), shipwright; Lord v. Jones, 24 Me. 439 (1844), farrier;
Moulton v. Greene, IO R. I. 33o (1872), repairman. See I Jones on Liens (3d ed.),
sec. 731 and cases cited. Dean Ames's contention that the benefit of a lien was
given where the repairman or other bailee had no remedy by express contract, and
before the promise implied in fact was recognized, is no doubt true historically,
but it is believed that theprinciple stated in the text is the one recognized by the
courts in modem times; see Ames' History of Assumpsit, 2 lHar.tL. R. 53, 61.
5It has been suggested that the privilege of lien is accorded to a common carrier
because of his obligation to receive and carry all goods offered and his exceptional
liability for loss of the goods: Yorke v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raymond (Eng.) 866
(I703); Rushforth v. Hatfield, 6 East (Eng.) 518 (I8o5). See i Jones on Liens
(3d ed.), sec. 262-3.6Steinman v. Wilkins, 7 Watts & S. (Pa.) 466 (1844).
UIn England this lien was regarded as a general lien based upon mercantile
custom: Naylor v. Mangles, i Esp. (Eng.) 109 (1794); Rex v. Humphrey, i Mc-
Clel. & Y. (Eng.) 173 (1825).8Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. (Eng.) 271 (1632); Jackson v. Cummings, 5
Mees. & W. (Eng.) 342 (1839). See Ames' History of Assumpsit, 2 Har. L. R.
53, 61.
PBeale, The Law of Innkeepers and Hotels, sees. 251-252.
'
0Robbins & Co. v. Gray, 2 Q. B. Div. 5oi (1895); Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482
(1886); Beale, op. cit., sees. 256, 261, 262.
"See, generally, i Jones on Liens (3d ed.) under the title of the liens named.
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animals fed and cared for by him, 2 and he was under no special duty
to serve, but this lien has been quite generally given by statute. 3
Liens have also been given by statute to laborers, to landlords, to
lumbermen and many others, 14 but the statutes conferring these last
named liens do not in many instances require that the lien claimant
be in possession, and many of them contain express provisions upon
the question of priority between the lien given and other liens. The
language of these statutes is exceedingly varied in the several juris-
dictions, and it is not thought that any extensive reference to them
can have any other result than to complicate the present discussion
by adding a mass of unrelated detail. For these reasons the treat-
ment of our problem in respect of statutory liens which were not recog-
nized at common law will be confined largely to the liens of the agister
and livery stable keeper, where the statutes are more uniform.
In many jurisdictions the common law liens mentioned above have
been re-enacted in the statute law, and methods of enforcement by
sale have been provided, and in some instances the nature of these
liens has been materially changed, but in the main these statutes have
resulted in mere codifications of the common law and have not effected
any considerable change except that they have given the lien claimant
a more satisfactory remedy by sale. It will be necessary, however, to
consider, as we proceed, the language of statutes codifying or altering
the common law liens mentioned in the last preceding paragraph.
I. IN RESPECT OF THE LIENS OF ARTISANS AND REPAIRMEN
In the leading English case of Williams v. Allsup,6 the court had
occasion to consider whether a shipwright who had repaired a vessel
at the request of the mortgagor in possession could enforce an artisan's
lien as against the mortgagee. It appeared that the mortgagor had
been left in possession of the vessel for the purpose of operating it to
earn money with which to pay off the mortgage. It appeared further
that the repairs were necessary and that the charges of the shipwright
were reasonable. In holding that the defendant's claim of lien was
well founded, Erle, C. J., used this language,"6 "I put my decision on
the ground suggested by Mr. Mellish, viz., that the mortgagee having
allowed the mortgagor to continue in the apparent ownership of the
vessel, making it a source of profit and a means of earning the where-
12Supra, n. 8.
131 Jones on Liens (3d ed.), ch. XIII.
14See, generally, i Jones on Liens (3rd ed.), under the appropriate titles.
'5io C. B. N. S. (Eng.) 417 (i86I).
"
8At pP. 426-7.
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withal to'pay off the mortgage debt, the relation so created by impli-
cation entitles the mortgagor to do all that may be necessary to keep
her in an efficient state for that purpose. The case states that the
vessel had been condemned as unseaworthy by the government sur-
veyor, and so was in a condition to be utterly unable to earn freight or
be an available security or any source of profit at all. Under these
circumstances, the mortgagor did that which was obviously for the
advantage of all parties interested: he put her into the hands of the
defendant to be repaired, and according to all ordinary usage, the
defendant ought to have a right of lien on the ship, so that those who
are interested in the ship, and who will be benefitted by the repairs,
should not be allowed to take her out of his hands without paying for
them. * * * It is to be observed that the money expended in repairs
adds to the value of the ship; and, looking to the rights and interests
of the parties generally, it cannot be doubted that it is much to the
advantage of the mortgagee that the mortgagor should be held to have
power to confer a right of lien on the ship for repairs necessary to keep
her seaworthy." It is to be observed that the decisionis expressly put
upon the following grounds: (i) that the repairs were necessary to
preserve the property and increased the value for the benefit of the
mortgagee, (2) that without the repairs it had become impossible for
the mortgagor to use the vessel and earn money wherewith to pay the
debt to the mortgagee as was contemplated under the terms of the
mortgage, and (3) that the mortgagee might be deemed to have con-
sented impliedly that the mortgagor might subject the vessel to a
lien. As thus limited and explained, it would seem that Williams v.
Allsup announces a perfectly sound principle, but one which it may
be difficult to apply to the facts of a particular case. This principle
was correctly applied in the Indiana case of Watts v. Sweeney,17 where
it was held that a mortgagee of a railway locomitive and tender was
not entitled to foreclose his mortgage so as to deprive a mechanic who
had repaired the locomotive of his lien. It appeared that it was within
the contemplation of the parties to the mortgage that the locomotive
should remain in the possession and use of the mortgagor to enable the
latter to operate the railway and earn money with which to pay off
the mortgage debt, that the repairs were necessary and reasonable for
this purpose and that the locomotive in question was the only one the
mortgagor possessed and therefore absolutely essential to the opera-
tion of the business. In deciding that the lien of the mortgagee was
17I27 nd. 116 (i89o). The repairman's lien was statutory, but the statute only
codified the common law, and did not affect the question of priority.
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postponed to the lien of the repairman, the court used this language, 8
"When the mortgagee intrusts machinery of the character in contro-
versy to the custody of the mortgagor for a long period of time, to be
used by the mortgagor in operating the railroad, it will be presumed
against the mortgagee that all necessary repairs were contemplated,
and the mortgagor was, in the case of needed repairs, constituted the
agent of the mortgagee in procuring such repairs, and in such case
equity gives the mechanic a lien for his services and materials. The
repairs add to the value of the property, and they are for the benefit of
the mortgagee as well as the mortgagor."
The principles announced in Williams v. Allsup and Watts v.
Sweeney have been the basis of decisions in many other cases in this
country where the question of priority has arisen between a mortgagee
or conditional seller of a chattel and an artisan or repairman attemp-
ting to assert a lien on the chattel for repairs made at the instance of
the mortgagor or conditional buyer in possession.' 9 Where the ele-
ments may reasonably be found to be present which were present in
the cases named, it would seem that these decisions may be supported.
But in many instances the courts have followed blindly the language
and result of these cases when the facts and situation of the parties
did not warrant the conclusion that the mortgagee or conditional
seller consented expressly or impliedly to have the mortgagor or con-
ditional buyer in possession subject the article in question to a lien
which should be prior to the duly recorded mortgage or conditional
sale.2 0 In a number of these cases the artisan's lien was declared to be
superior where there was no other evidence of consent than the fact
that the mortgagor or conditional buyer was in possession of the chat-
tel and entitled to use it for his own benefit with the probable result
that repairs might be needed, but where it did not appear that he was
expected to earn money by using the chattel for the purpose of paying
the mortgage debt. The result of these decisions would seem to be
28At p. 123.
'
0Weber Implement & Auto Co. v. Pearson, 132 Ark. IOI (1917); Hammond v.
Danielson, 126 Mass. 294 (1879); Kirtley v. Morris, 43 Mo. App. 144 (I89O), but
see Hampton v. Seible, 58 Mo. App. 181 (1894); Drummond Carriage Co. v.
Mills, 54 Nebr. 417 (1898); White v. Smith, 44 N. J. L. io5 (1882); Scott v. Dela-
hunt, 5 Lans. (N. Y.) 372 (1872), Affd. 65 N. Y. 128; Reeves & Co. v. Russell,
28 N. D. 265 (1914); Keene v. Thomas, (19o5) i K. B. (Eng.) 136; Gurevitch v.
Melchoir, 29 3. C. (Can.) 294 (1921).20Rehm v. Viall, 185 Ill. App. 425 (1914); Etchens v. Dennis, 104 Kan. 241
(1919); Meyers v. Neeley, 143 Md. 107 (1923); Broom v. Dale, 109 Miss. 52
(1915); Guaranty Security Corp. v. Brophy, 137 N. E. (Mass.) 751 (1923), noted
i 7 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 259; Ruppert v. Zaug, 73 N. J. L. 216 (1905);
Terminal & Town Taxi Corp. v. O'Rourke, 117 Misc. (N. Y.) 761 (1922), semble;
Garr v. Clements, 4 N. Dak. 559 (1895), semble.
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that a mortgagor or conditional buyer in possession could always
destroy the security of his mortgagee or seller except where forbidden
to use the article in question. In some cases the fact that the mort-
gagee or conditional seller knew that the repairs were being made has
been considered sufficient to show implied consent that the mortgagor
might subject the chattel to a paramount lien.2' The fact that the
repairs increase the value of the chattel and inure to the benefit of the
mortgagee has been given by the courts as a reason for preferring the
lien of the repairman,22 but it would seem that this factor is of no im-
portance if the person in possession had no right or authority to sub-
ject the interest of the owner to a lien, and it might be suggested that
the owner should have some voice in the matter.
In many cases, however, where there was no evidence that the
mortgagee or conditional seller authorized the mortgagor or condi-
tional buyer to subject the chattel to an artisan's lien, or where such
conduct was expressly forbidden, the courts have squarely faced the
question whether there is anything in the nature of the artisan's lien,
or in principle, which demands that the claim of the artisan or re-
pairman shall take precedence over the lien or title of the prior re-
corded encumbrance. The majority of the courts have reached the
conclusion that the lien or interest which is prior in time is prior in
right, and that there is nothing in the nature of the subsequent lien,
or in the relation of the parties, from which the mortgagor or condi-
tional buyer is authorized or entitled in law to defeat the prior inter-
est.2 3 In a Georgia case24 the court held that equity would not enjoin
the conditional seller of an automobile from recovering his property by
an appropriate action at law from a repairman who was seeking to fore-
21Etchen v. Dennis, 104 Kan. 241 (1919); Broom v. Dale, 109 Miss. 52 (1915).
See Hollis v. Isbell, 124 Miss. 799 (1921), contra, on the ground that the condition-
al seller did not know that the repairs were being made.
nSee cases cited supra, n. 19, 20. It should be observed that mere increase in
value is no ground for depriving the owner of his property where the repairs are
made at the instance of a wrongdoer: Hiscox v. Greenwood, 4 Esp. (Eng.) 174
(1802), repairs orcdered by servant; Clark v. Hale, 34 Conn. 398 (1867), purchaser
from converter had repairs made; Hollingsworth v. Dow, i Pick. (Mass.) 228(1837), no lien in favor of subcontractor; Globe Works v. Wright, lO6 Mass. 207(187o), no lien in favor repairman where mortgagor agreed to make repairs him-
self; Meyers v. Bratespiece, 174 Pa. 119 (1896), no lien in favor subcontractor.23Wilson v. Donaldson, 121 Cal. 8 (1898); Atlas Securities Co. v. Grove, 137
N.E. (Ind. App.) 570 (1922); Madison, etc., Ass'n v. Wells, 137 N. E. (Ind. App.)
769 (1923); Small v. Robinson, 69 Me. 425 (1879); Bath Motor Mart v. Miller,
122 Me. 29 (1922); Globe Works v. Wright, 1o6 Mass. 207 (1870); Denison v.Shuler, 47 Mich. 598 (1882); Hollis v. Isbell, 124 Miss. 799 (1921); Hampton v.
Seible 58 Mo. App. 181 (1894); Cache Auto. Co. v. Central Garage, 221 Pac.(Utah5 862 (1923); Beecher v. Thompson, 120 Wash. 520 (1922); Scott v. Mercer,
88 W. Va. 92 (1921).
24Baughmann Auto. Co. v. Emanuel, 137 Ga. 354 (1911).
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close an artisan's lien for repairs and materials furnished at the instance
of the conditional buyer. It was suggested that the remedy of the re-
pairman was to pay off the conditional seller and then subject the auto-
mobile to alien as against the buyer. To the criticism that this suggest-
ed remedy works an undue hardship on the repairman, and that the
chattel may not be of sufficient value to afford him protection, the
answer is made that he acts voluntarily with actual or constructive
notice of the prior rights of the seller, and consequently is not en-
titled to a preference. And in Shaw v. WebbI5 the court reached the
same conclusion, distinguishing cases like Watts v. Sweeney" where
there was sufficient evidence that the conditional seller or mortgagee
had impliedly consented that his interest should be postponed to the
subsequent lien of a repairman and cases like Keene v. Thomas27 where
the superiority of the repariman's lien was sustained by reason of an
express provision in the contract of mortgage or sale. Referring to
the last named case, the Tennessee court said,28 "Doubtless a court, in
order to sustain a claim of lien, would not hesitate to seize upon any
provision in a contract retaining title or in a mortgage which may be
construed to look to the making of repairs or improvements at the
instance of the vendee or mortgagor in possession."
The cases announcing the majority rule have pointed out that in
general liens take priority according to the time when they attached
to the property, that it is not the policy of the law to take the property
of one man to pay the debts of another, and that any other holding
would seriously impair the security of the mortgagee or conditional
seller and render these forms of doing business too precarious for
practical use. Furthermore, it is true that the repairman acts vol-
untarily, wherein he differs from the innkeeper discussed hereafter,
and if the prior encumbrance is duly recorded as required by statute,
the repairman has actual or constructive notice. If the mortgage or
conditional sale is not recorded, it will depend upon the language of
the recording statute whether or not the person subsequently repair-
ing or rendering services is intended to be protected. This matter is
discussed below.
In some jurisdictions the lien of the artisan or repairman takes pre-
cedence over a prior recorded chattel mortgage or conditional sale by
2Shaw v. Webb. 13I Tenn. 173 (1914).26Supra, n. 17.
27(J905) i K. B. 136, where the hire-purchase agreement provided that the
prospective buyer should keep the dogcart in repair.28At p. 182.
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virtue of express statute.29 Occasionally these statutes provide that
the artisan or repairman shall have a lien on the property when the
services were rendered at the request of "the owner or legal possessor
of the property," or some similar phrase. 0 Obviously, under statutes
of this character there can be no doubt that the repairman's hen will
be given priority unless such statutes are unconstitutional. It has
been held that a statute is unconstitutional which purports to sub-
ordinate a valid existing right to a subsequently acquired lien, the
right of the mortgagee or conditional seller having been vested before
the statute in question was enacted." This would not be true in a
jurisdiction which held that at common law the lien or title of the
chattel mortgagee was postponed to the subsequently acquired lien
of the repairman, since there the statute would merely be declaratory
of the common law rule as it existed before the adoption of the con-
stitution. It would seem that a statute would not be unconstitu-
tional, as interfering with the freedom or obligation of contracts or as
taking property without due process, where the statute provides that
the lien of a repairman or artisan should be preferred to the prior
interest of a mortgagee or conditional seller, provided the statute was
enacted before the rights of the mortgagee or conditional seller at-
tached, since in that case they would enter into the mortgage or con-
ditional sale with full knowledge of the statute and subject to its
provisions.32 It will not be implied, however, that the legislature in-
tended a statutory lien to take priority over the right or interest of a
conditional seller or mortgagee when the statute in question does not
expressly or by clear implication declare such superiority.3 It has
been repeatedly stated that in general statutory liens will attach sub-
ject to all prior liens and claims against the property. Conversely,
291 Jones on Liens, sees. 73I-786c.
30See, for example, Davenport v. Grundy Motor Sales Co., 28 Cal. App. 409
(1915); Reeves & Co. v. Russell, 28 N. D. 265 (1914); Crosier v. Cudihee, 85
Wash. 237 (1915), statute repealed before decision in Wilcox v. Mobley, 116
Wash. 1I8 (1921); Smith Auto. Co. v. Kaestner, 164 Wis. 205 (1916). Sometimes
the statutory lien is expressly postponed, as in Burrow v. Fowler, 68 Ark. 178
(19oo). See also sees. 183-184 of the N. Y. Lien Law (L. 19o9, c. 38).3 National Bank v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555 (1907); Betts v. Ratliff, 5o Miss. 561
(1874).
Obviously it would not be unconstitutional to subordinate the prior interest to
a subsequent lien if the prior encumbrancer gave his consent, expressly or by
implication.32See Howard v. Burke, 176 Ia. 123 (1916); Terminal, etc., Corp. v. O'Rourke,
117 Misc. (N. Y.) 761 (1922); Crosier v. Cudihee, 85 Wash. 237 (1915). But see
Jensen v. Wilcox Lumber Co., 295 Ill. 294 (i920), statute making lien for storage
superior to chattel mortgage held unconstitutional.3Easter v. Goyne, 51 Ark. 222 (1889), lien in favor of keeper of stallion; Wilson
v. Donaldson, 121 Cal. 8 (1898), laborer's lien; Peter Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Wheeler,
212 N. Y. 9o (1914).
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there are some dicta that common law liens attach to the chattel re-
gardless of ownership,34 but it is not believed that these dicta state a
true doctrine except in respect of the common law lien of the inn-
keeper.
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD CHATTEL MORTGAGE
OR CONDITIONAL SALE
At common law a chattel mortgage was deemed fradulent as to
creditors of the mortgagor unless the possession of the property was
delivered to and retained by the mortgagee.35 So, obviously, an arti-
san or repairman would prevail over the mortgagee, where the mort-
gagor was left in possession, but for the recording statutes. Leaving
out of consideration local peculiarities in these statutes, their effect is
to do away with the requirement that the mortgagee take possession
of theproperty, provided he duly acknowledges and records the chattel
mortgage as required by the particular statute.36 As between the
parties to the mortgage the agreement is valid without either delivery
of possession or recording, but under the statutes a chattel mortgage
is void as to creditors of the mortgagor unless it is accompanied by
delivery of possession, or recorded or filed in the manner prescribed.
It follows that the mortgagee can never prevail over a repairman who
contracts with the mortgagor in possession unless the mortgage is
duly recorded. This statement is subject to the qualification that in
many jurisdictions the creditor is not protected by the recording
statute if he had actual notice of the prior unrecorded chattel mort-
gage.37
In the field of conditional sales the history of recording statutes is
somewhat different. At common law the great majority of the courts
reached the conclusion that the title of the conditional seller should be
protected as against purchasers from and creditors of the conditional
buyer even though the buyer had been given possession and use of the
property by the seller, and the seller was accordingly permitted to
recover the property from such purchasers and creditrs.3 s Likewise,
the courts declined to hold that the conditional sale was subject to
statutes providing for the recording of filing of chattel mortgages.3 9
34Ruppert v. Zaug, 73 N. J. L. 216 (i905); Peter Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Wheeler,
supra, n. 33-
3Russell v. Fillmore, 15 Vt. 130 (1843). See Williston on Sales (2d ed.), see.
352 et seq.
36Jones on Chattel Mortgages (5th ed.), ch. VI, VII.
37jones on Chattel Mortgages (5th ed.), sees. 313-318.3 Harkness v. Russell, 118 U. S. 663 (1886). For a complete collection of the
authorities, see Bogert's Commentaries on Conditional Sales, sees. 47-48.
-Bogert, op. cit., sec. 54.
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But in a majority of the states, statutes have been enacted which pro-
vide for the recording or filing of conditional sale contracts.4 0 These
statutes vary materially as to the classes of persons who will be en-
titled to prevail over the seller if the contract is unrecorded. Some
protect only purchasers for value from the mortgagee and his judg-
ment or attaching creditors without notice of the conditional sale.
Other statutes protect all "third parties" without notice, or even
make the contract void as to all persons except the seller and buyer
unless it be duly recorded. Section 5 of the Uniform Conditional
Sales Act provides, "Every provision in a conditional sale reserving
property in the seller shall be void as to any purchaser from or creditor
of the buyer, who, without notice of such provision purchases the
goods or acquires by attachment or levy a lien upon them, before the
contract or a copy thereof shall be filed as hereinafter provided, unless
such contract or copy is so filed within ten days after the maldng of
the conditional sale." It would seem that in those jurisdictions which
have adopted the uniform act 4' it is not required that the conditional
seller shall record his contract so far as artisans or repairmen who act
at. the instance of the buyer are concerned, since they are not pur-
chasers nor have they acquired a lien by attachment or levy.A The
same is true in those jurisdictions where there is no statute requiring
the recording of conditional sales, and in those states where the record-
ing statutes are not broad enough to protect the creditors of the buyer
generally.4 But where the recording statutes are broad enough to
protect the creditors of the buyer generally, or all "third parties," the
seller must record his contract if he expects or hopes to prevail over
the artisan or repairman or other lien claimant who acts at the in-
stance of the buyer.45
RULE AS TO CARRIERS, WAREHOUSEMEN, ETC.
The priority which is generally accorded to a chattel mortgagee or
conditional seller of goods against an artisan or repairman who sub-
40Bogert, op. cit., sec. 53. The substance of the various statutes is given, to-
gether with full citations to authorities. See also 2 Uniform Laws Ann. 42 et See.4tAlaska (L. 1919, C. 13); Arizona (L. 1919, c. 40); Delaware (L. 1919, C. 192);
New Jersey (L. 1919, C. 210); New York (L. 1922, c. 642); South Dakota (L. 1919,
C. 137); West Virginia (L. 1921, c. 75); Wisconsin (L. I919, c. 672).
4Commercial Credit Co. v. Vineis, 12o Atl. (N. J.) 417 (1923), landlord not
protected.42Reischmann v. Masker, 69 N. J. L. 353 (i9o3), before adoption of Uniform
Cond. Sales Act; Beebe v. Fouse, 27 N. M. 194 (1924); Bath Motor Mart v.
Miller, 122 Me. 29 (1922).
"4See Winton Co. v. Meister, 133 Ind. 318 (1918).45In Massachusetts the conditional seller cannot prevail over the repairman un-
less the latter has actual notice of the rights of the conditional seller. Dunbar-
Laporte Motor Co. v. Desrocher, 142 N. E. (Mass.) 57 (1924).
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sequently attempts to assert a lien for repairs or services rendered at
the request of the mortgagor or conditional buyer in possession is
likewise accorded as against a common carrier who carries the goods
at the instance of the mortgagor or conditional buyer.4 Thus, in the
case of Owen v. Burlington, etc., Co.,47 it was held that the lien of the
carrier for transporting a merry-go-round at the request of a chattel
mortgagor was inferior to the right of the chattel mortgagee, though
the latter had permitted the mortgagor to remain in possession and
use of the article, and to move it around within the state, and infer-
entially the mortgagor was using the article for the purpose of earning
money with which to pay off the mortgage. It appeared that the
carrier had actual notice of the rights of the mortgagee. It would
seem that in this case the court might have implied the consent on the
part of the mortgagee which was implied in Watts v. Sweeney48 or
Keene v. Thomas.49 A like result was reached in a Mississippi case50
in which the court made the added suggestion that the railway com-
pany might have demanded the freight in advance. It seems to be
well settled that a carrier can claim no lien against the owner, mort-
gagee, or conditional seller when the goods have been delivered to the
carrier by a wrongdoer, or by one rightfully in possession but without
any authority to have the goods carried for the owner.5° . The same
principles which have been applied to the liens of the artisan and car-
rier would seem to apply to the lien of a warehouseman or wharfinger, 51
or to any other similar lien recognized under the common law. It
would seem to make no difference that in many jurisdictions these
liens are now given by statute. The statutes were generally enacted
for the purpose of providing a remedy for the enforcement of the lien,
46Savannah, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 123 Ga. 378 (19o5), goods delivered to car-
rier by wrongdoer; Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 137 (1849), goods de-
livered to carrier by wrongdoer; Gilson v. Gwinn, 1o7 Mass. 126 (1871), goods
delivered to carrier by bailee; Corinth Engine & Boiler Works v. Miss. Cent.
R. Co., 95 Miss. 817 (i9o9); Singer Mfg. Co. v. London, etc., R. Co. (1894) 1 Q.
B. 833, semble contra.
47II S. D. I53 (I898).
48Supra, n. 17.
4"Supra, n. 19.
:Corinth Engine & Boiler Works v. R. Co., supra, n. 46.
BfSwinson v. The Atchison, etc., R. Co., 230 Pac. (Kans.) 1046 (1924).
"
1Graben Motor Co. v. Brown Garage Co., 195 N. W. (Ia.) 752 (1923), storage;
Storms v. Smith, 137 Mass. 201 (1884), storage; Vette v. Leonori, 42 Mo. App.
217 (i89O), storage; Baumann v. Post, I6 Daly (N. Y.) 385 (189o), at time when
N. Y. statute did not give warehouseman prior lien for storage; Peter Barrett
Mfg. Co. v. Wheeler, 212 N. Y. 90 (1914), not within statute giving priority;
Leitch v. Sanford Motor Tr. Co., 123 Atl. (Pa.) 658 (1924) ;Adler v. Godfrey, 153
Wis. 186 (1913), although the mortgagee knew that the goods were being stored.
Contra, Singer Mfg. Co. v. London, etc., R. Co., supra, n. 46.
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or for the purpose of extending its scope, or for the simple purpose of
codification. In the absence of a change accomplished expressly or
by implication in the language of the statute,52 the same principles will
be applied to these liens under the statutes as were applied at common
law.
II. THE LIEN IN FAVOR OF AN INNKEEPER OR
LODGING-HOUSE KEEPER
The principles applied to the lien of the innkeeper at common law
were somewhat different from those applied to the liens previously
discussed. The lien of the innkeeper was based upon the fact that he
was held liable for the loss of the goods of his guest practically as an
insurer, and he was under a duty to receive as guests all transients who
applied at his inn together with their baggage up to the limit of his
accommodations, and possibly the keeping of the goods by the inn-
keeper was a benefit to the goods." In view of the exceptional burdens
imposed upon the innkeeper, it was thought just that he be given a
lien on the goods of his guest to secure his charges for the entertain-
ment of the guest and for the keeping and care of the goods. The lien
extended to all the goods brought by the guest to the inn, and re-
ceived by the innkeeper on the faith of the relation, whether or not
the goods belonged to the guest, provided only that the innkeeper did
not know that the guest was wrongfully in possession of the goods in
question. 4 The courts have continued to apply these principles
52See the following illustrative cases where the language of the statutes was im-
portant: Monthly Installment Loan Co. v. Skellet Co., 124 Minn. 144 (1913);
statute gave warehouseman a lien where goods deposited "at the request of the
owner or legal possessor of any personal property;" Willis-Overland Co. v. Prud-
man Auto. Co., 196 N.Y. S. 487 (1922). In Lloyd v. Kilpatrick, 71 Misc. (N. Y.)
19 (191 x), the statute provided for a lien in favor of the warehouseman where goods
deposited with the consent of the owner "whether such owner be a conditional
vendee or a mortgagor remaining in possession or otherwise," but it was held that
the consent of the conditional vendee would not beiimplied. InDoodyv. Collins,
223 Mass. 332 (i916), the owner was estopped to deny the authority of the bailee.
portant: Monthly Installment Loan Co. v. Skellet Co., 124 Minn..(19i3);statute
gave warehouseman a lien where goods deposited "at the request of the owner or
legal possessor of any personal property;" Willis-Overland Co. v. Prudmaii Auto.
Co., I96 N. Y. S. 487 (1922). In Lloydv. Kilpatrick, 71 Misc.(N.Y.) 19 (1911), the
statute provided for a lien in favor of the warehouseman where goods deposited
with the consent of the owner "whether such owner be a conditional vendee or a
mortgagor remaining in possession or otherwise," but it was held that the consent
of the conditional vendee would not be implied. In Doody v. Collins, 223 Mass.
332 (1916), the owner was estopped to deny the authority of the bailee.51Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482 (1886); Beale on Innkeepers and Hotels, sees.
25I-253.
uThrefall v. Borwick, L. R. 7 Q. B. 711 (1872); Robbins & Co. v. Gray, (1895)
2 Q. B. 5oi; Gordon v. Silber, L. R. 25 Q. B. 491 (I89O); Jones V. Morrill,
Barb. (N. Y.) 623 (1864); R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, 136 Mich. 611 (1904);
Cook v. Kane, 13 Ore. 482 (1886). See Beals, op. cit. secs. 261-2.
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where the lien of the innkeeper has been given by statute, on the
ground that the statutes are merely declaratory of common law prin-
ciples," unless this interpretation is precluded by the language of the
statute. It is interesting to note that the privilege accorded to the
innkeeper of holding a lien upon the goods of third parties has never
been given to the common carrier,56 though it is admitted that the
latter is under an equal duty to serve all applicants, and is under an
insurer's liability which is equal to that imposed on the innkeeper. It
is said that the carrier might demand the freight in advance, but is not
the same true of the innkeeper, at least in modem practice? Suffice
it to say that the lien of the innkeeper has'been considered broader
than the other common law liens, and attaches to any goods brought
by the guest to the inn and received by the innkeeper on the faith of
the relation.
So the innkeeper is generally permitted to assert his lien as against
the conditional seller and chattel mortgagee. In Horace Waters Co.
v. Gerard57 the plaintiff sold a piano by conditional sale to one Car-
lisle and delivered it to her while she was a guest at the defendant's
hotel. At that time she was a technical guest and indebted to the
defendant, and she subsequently became indebted to a greater extent.
Still later she took an apartment at the hotel upon a year's lease, by
the lease expressly giving the defendant a lien upon all property,
brought into the hotel by the said Carlisle. She occupied under the
lease for about three months and incurred further indebtedness. De-
fendant had no notice of the rights of the plaintiff until after the guest
left the hotel. It was held that the lien of the defendant was good
against the plaintiff under a statute giving the keeper of a hotel or inn
a lien on the baggage or other personal property brought upon the
premises by the guest, although, owned by a third party, unless the
proprietor knew that it was not the property of the guest, or not
legally in his possession. It was held further that the statute was con-
stitutional since it did not give the innkeeper any greater rights than
at common law, and that it was not against public policy; that the
common law lien of the innkeeper was not repugnant to the constitu-
tion of New York, by the adoption of which the common law of
England was declared to be the law of the state, and the statutory
lien was a mere codification. In another case5 8 construing the same
55R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melenbacker, supra, n. 54; Horace Waters & Co. v. Ge-
rard, 189 N. Y. 302 (1907). But see Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., 24 Mo. App.
382 (1887).56Supra, n. 46, 47, 50.57Supra, n. 55.5sMatthews v. Victor Hotel Co., 74 Misc. (N. Y.) 426 (191I), Afld. I5o App.
Div. (N. Y.) 928.
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statute the Supreme Court of New York has held that the lien of the
hotel keeper is superior to a prior duly recorded chattel mortgage on
the property brought to the hotel by the guest, that the hotel keeper
did not have notice that the property was not the property of the
guest from the record of the chattel mortgage, since by the recording
statute the record was notice to "creditors, purchasers, and subse-
quent mortgagees" only. These two cases illustrate the almost
universal holding that the lien of the inn or hotel keeper is preferred
to the claims of third parties who have entrusted their goods to the
person who later becomes a guest at the inn or hotel.59 Knowledge on
the part of the innkeeper or hotelkeeper that the guest is not the owner
of the goods should not defeat the lien unless the guest is known to be
wrongfully in possession. 0
At common law the keeper of a boarding house or lodging house was
not given a lien on the goods of his guest, since the boarding house
keeper or lodging house keeper was not under the duty to serve all
who applied, nor was he subjected to the same extraordinary liability
as the innkeeper."i In many jurisdictions, however, the lien of the
innkeeper has been extended by statute to boarding house keepers
and lodging house keepers. Where the statutes give the same lien
which was accorded to the innkeeper at common law, the same prin-
ciples will govern the statutory lien,6 but in many jurisdictions the
statutory lien of the boarding house keeper or lodging house keeper
is not so broad as the common law lien of the innkeeper. A rather
common form of statute is one which provides that the lien shall at-
tach to the "goods of the guest," or where the property is brought by
the "owner or legal possessor," or other like restriction."
59See Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 1o3 Ia. 586 (1897); R. L. Polk & Co. v. Melen-
backer, supra, n. 54; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 52 Minn. 516 (i893); Leonard v.
Harris, 147 App. Div. (N. Y.) 458 (1911), Affd. 21H N. Y. 511; Cook v. Kane,
supra, n. 53; Robbins & Co. v. Gray, supra, n. 54. Contra, because of the language
of the statutes: Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., supra, n. 55; Mercer v. Lowery,
193 Mo. App. io6 (1916); McClain v. Williams, ii S. D. 227 (1898); Chickering-
Chase Bros. Co. v. L. J. White & Co., 127 Wis. 83 (1906).
G°Robbins & Co. v. Gray, supra, n. 59. There are some decisions and dicta
contra, for which see Beale, op. cit., sec. 262.
GBeale, op. cit., sec. 252 and cases cited.
611 Jones on Liens (3d ed.), sec. 515; Beale, op. cit., sec. 298.63Leonard v. Harris, supra, n. 59; Nance v. 0. K. Houck Piano Co., 128 Tenn.
i (1913). But see n. 31, 32, supra.
64See, for example, Wyckoff v. Southern Hotel Co., supra, n. 55; McClain v.
Williams, supra, i. 59; Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. Hotel Stevens Co., 38
Wash. 4o9 (i9o5); Chickering-Chase Bros. Co. v. L. 3. White & Co., 127 Wis. 83(i9o6).
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III. GENERAL LIENS BASED UPON MERCANTILE CUSTOiM!
Questions of priority between a chattel mortgagee or conditional
seller and a subsequent lien claimant do not seem to have arisen in
respect of the general liens of brokers, attorneys, factors, consignees,
etc. This is no doubt due to the fact that these liens are usually ap-
plied to negotiable securities, or the relations of the parties are such
that it would involve a criminal act for the mortgagor or conditional
buyer to attempt to transfer the goods to a factor or consignee. It is
not believed that the principles to be applied when the question of
priority arises are materially different from those applied to the lien
of the artisan or carrier discussed above.
IV. THE STATUTORY LIEN OF THE AGISTER OR
LIVERY STABLE KEEPER
The common law did not grant a lien to the agister or livery stable
keeper to secure to him his charges for feeding or pasturage or care of
animals.65 It was not thought that the agister added any value to the
animals so kept or fed unless in the exceptional case where the animal
was fattened for the slaughter or trained for some special purpose. By
statute, however, in almost all jurisdictions a lien has been given to
agisters and livery stable keepers, as well as to their modern successor,
the garage keeper.66 The fact that these statutes follow rather closely
the model of the previously known common law liens, and are fairly
uniform in the various jurisdictions, makes it possible to select this
class for a brief discussion of the problem of this article as applied to
statutory liens which were wholly unknown at common law. It is
generally held that the interest of the conditional seller or chattel
mortgagee is superior to the lien of an agister or livery stable keeper
subsequently acquired, even though the agister or livery stable
keeper had no knowledge of the prior encumbrance,67 unless the owner
65Lewis v. Tyler, 23 Cal. 364 (1863); Goodrich v. Willard, 7 Gray (Mass.) 183
(1856); Chapman v. Allen, Cro. Car. (Eng.) 271 (1632); Jackson v. Cummins, 5
Mees. & W. (Eng.) 342 (1839). See i Jones on Liens (3d ed.), sees. 641-5. Cf.
Ames, History of Assumpsit, 2 Har. L. R. 53, 6I.
61 Jones on Liens, ch. XIII, and cases cited infra.
67Chapman v. Bank, 98 Ala. 528 (1893); Rohrer v. Ross, 53 Colo. 328 (1912);
Haunch v. Ripley, 127 Ind. i5i (i89o); Bch v. Moore, 124 Ia. 564 (1904), lan-
guage of statute; Lee v. Vanmeter, 98 Ky. 1 (1895), language of statute; Bowdenv.
Dugan, 91 Me. 14I (1898); Howes v. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76 (1888); Erickson v.
Lampi, i5o Mich. 92 (1907); Pickett v. McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467 (1895); Cable
v. Duke, 132 Mo. App. 334 (i9o8); Bank v. Lowe, 22 Nebr. 68 (1887); Sargent v.
Usher, 55 N. H. 287 (1875); Sullivan v. Clifton, 55 N. J. L. 324 (1893); Nat. Bank
of Commerce v. Jones, 18 Okla. 555 (1907); Wright v. Sherman, 3 S. D. 290 (1892);
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consented to the creation of a paramount lien 8 or the language of
the statute indicated the intention of the legislature to prefer the
lien claimant.69 It has been suggested that in general statutory liens
are intended to be given subject to prior encumbrances, a principle
which has been sometimes erroneously denied as to common law
liens. 70 Thus in McGhee v. Edwardsn it was held that the lien of a
duly recorded chattel mortgage on a horse was entitled to priority
over a subsequently acquired livery stable keeper's lien under the
Tennessee statute, and that the filing of the chattel mortgage was
notice to the livery stable keeper, and this result was reached in
spite of the fact that the Tennessee statute gave the livery stable
keeper a lien by reference to another statute which in effect made it
the same as the common law lien of the innkeeper. So the courts
generally hold that the filing of the chattel mortgage is constructive
notice to the agister or livery stable keeper unless the language of the
recording statute precludes such a holding,72 and since the agister has
notice of the prior encumbrance, and since he acts voluntarily at the
request of the mortgagor," he is entitled to no special protection and
will not be permitted to claim priority over the mortgagee. Like-
wise, it is generally held that the mortgagor's possession and use of
the animals with the consent of the mortgagee does not show that the
mortgagee authorized the mortgagor to subject the property to a
paramount lien.7 4
In some cases it is held that the lien of the mortgagee will be post-
poned to the lien of the subsequent livery stable keeper if the mort-
McGhee v. Edwards, 87 Tenn. 5o6 (1889); Masterson v. Pelz, 86 S. W. (Tex.
C. A.) 56 (I9O5); Grubb v. Lashus, 42 Utah 254 (i913); Ingalls v. Vance, 6i Vt.
582 (1889).
68Woodward v. Myers, 15 Ind. App. 42 (1895); Bowden v. Dugan, 91 Me. 14i(1898); Howes v. Newcomb, 146 Mass. 76 (1888), semble; Lynde v. Parker 155
Mass. 481 (1892); Miller v. Crabbe, 66 Mo. App. 66o (1896); Ingalls v. Vance, 61
Vt. 582 (1889), semble.69Colquitt v. Kirkman, 47 Ga. 55 (1873); Smith v. Stevens, 36 Minn. 30.3(86), but the Mi p. statute was changed in 189i; see Petzenka v. Dallimore,
64 Mu.472 (1896); Corning v. Ashley, 51 Hun (N. Y.) 48.3 (1889), Affd. 121N. Y. 700; Peter Barrett Mfg. Co. v. Van Ronk, 212 N. Y. g0 (1914), but cf.Bissell v. Pearce, 28 N. Y. 252 (1863). See, also Nat. Bank of Commerce v.Jones, supra, n. 67, where it was held that a statute adopted after the rights; of
the chattel mortgagee vested was unconstitutional in providing that the agister's
lien should be preferred to such mortgage.70Sullivan v. Clifton, 55 N. J. L. 324 (1893); Stone v. Kelley, 59 Mo. App. 214(1894).
7187 Tenn. 506 (1889).72Chapman v. Bank, supra, n. 67; Haunch v. Ripley, supra, n. 67; Wright v.
Sherman, supra, n. 67; McGhee v. Edwards, supra, n. 71.73Pickett v. McCord, 62 Mo. App. 467 (895); Wright v. Sherman, 3 S. D. 29o
(1892); McGhee v. Edwards, supra, n. 71.74See cases cited supra, n. 67.
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gagor knew or had reason to know that the animals were being fed or
cared for by the livery stable keeper, 75 but it would seem that such
consent should not be implied against the mortgagee upon such
slender evidence. In one or two jurisdictions it is held that the agister's
lien is entitled to priority over a duly recorded chattel mortgage on
the animals, these decisions being based on the reasoning that the
keeping of the animals is for the benefit of the mortgagee, and that
the cost of the keeping for which the lien is given is usually small in
comparison with the value of the animals. So, in Case v. Allen 6 the
Supreme Court of Kansas said, " * * * the principle seems to be, that
where the mortgagee does not take the possession, but leaves it with
the mortgagor, he thereby assents to the creation of a statutory lien
for any expenditure reasonably necessary for the preservation or
ordinary repair of the thing mortgaged. Such indebtedness really
inures to his benefit. The entire value of his mortgage may rest upon
the creation of such indebtedness and lien, as in the case at bar,
where the thing mortgaged is live stock, and the lien for food. * * *
The amount due under such liens is usually small-a mere trifle com-
pared with the value of the thing upon which the lien is claimed.
* * * It is probable that the amount of the agister's lien, as against
the mortgagee, would be fixed, not by the contract with the mort-
gagor, but by the reasonable value of the services." The Kansas
court relied upon cases involving the liens of innkeepers-and admiralty
liens, and upon Williams v. Allsup 7 7 and similar cases. The decision
of Case v. Allen has not met with favor except in jurisdictions where
the language of the statutes expressly or by clear implication indi-
cates the intention of the legislatures that the lien of the agister
should be preferred. The question as to the constitutionality of such
statutes depends upon the same principles which were discussed with
reference to similar statutes in the field of artisans' liens.7 8 In the
absence of a preference based upon statute, it would seem that the
agister is sufficiently protected by the personal liability of the mort-
gagor or conditional seller, and by the privilege he has of paying off
the prior encumbrance for the purpose of subjecting the chattel to
his lien .7
The principles which apply to the statutory lien of the agister
71See cases cited supra, n. 67, 68.
712r Kan. 217 (1878). See also Colquitt v. Kirkman, 47 Ga. 555 (x873), and
Vose v. Whitney, 7 Mont. 385 (1888).
77Supra, na. 15.78Nat. Bank of Commerce v. Jones, supra, n. 69.79See Ingalls v. Green, 62 Vt. 436 (189o).
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apply with equal force to the lien in favor of the keeper of a stallion
or jack, 0 to the statutory lien of a warehouseman,8' and to many
other statutory liens too numerous to be covered in this article. And
in respect of many of these statutory liens it may be added that they
depend so largely upon the peculiar language of the local statutes, and
differ so widely, as to be impossible of treatment in the limited space
allotted to this article.
The following conclusions may be stated: (a) The general rule is
that the lien or title of a duly recorded chattel mortgage or condition-
al sale is preferred to the lien of an artisan or repairman, who works
upon the chattel at the request of the mortgagor or conditional seller,
unless there is evidence that the mortgagee or conditional seller has
consented expressly or impliedly to the imposition of a paramount lien.
The same result is reached whether the artisan's lien is claimed under
common law principles or under the statutes codifying the common
law lieh, unless the language of the statute expressly or by implication
indicates that it was the intention of the legislature to give the artisan
a paramount lien. (b) The same principles apply to the purely
statutory liens which have been given to agisters, livery stable keepers
and others. (c) Unless modified by statute, the lien of the innkeeper
and hotel keeper is entitled to priority over a duly recorded chattel
mortgage or conditional sale, previously given, where the goods were
brought to the inn or hotel by the mortgagor or conditional buyer in
possession, and the innkeeper did not know that the possession of the
guest was wrongful. Where the innkeeper's lien is extended by statute
to boarding house keepers and lodging house keepers, the same prin-
ciples will apply, but a statute may not impair the obligation of con-
tracts made before its enactment.
PROPOSED LEGIs ATioN
The second tentative draft of the proposed Uniform Chattel Mort-
gage Act, discussed by the Committee on a Uniform Chattel Mortgage
Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at Chicago, February 26 and 27, 1925, provides in Section 34:
"Liens given by any statute or rule of law against an owner of goods,
so far as they arise out of acts of the mortgagor incidental to the
production, maintenance, preservation, repair, storage, transportation
'"Mayfield v. Spiva, ioo Ala, 223 (1893); Easter v. Goyne, 51 Ark. 222 (1889).
But see Sims v. Bradford, 80 Tenn. 434 (1883).$See cases cited supra, n. 51.
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or use of the goods in the ordinary course of business and not other-
wise, shall attach against the interest of the mortgagee as well as
against the interest of the mortgagor, although the mortgage be filed
as required by statute."
This proposed rule has been called to the writer's attention since
the main body of this article was written. It may be suggested that
this rule would be desirable in that it would bring about a settled rule
in respect of chattel mortgages, unless the words "ordinary course of
business" should prove a stumbling block.
